We investigate the relation between derivatives use and corporations' cost of equity capital. Using a large sample of non-financial firms, we compute and analyze (i) the relative cost of equity of firms that use derivatives and those that do not; and (ii) the change in cost of equity experienced by firms initiating derivatives programs. We find that the cost of equity of derivatives users is lower than non-users by 24-78 basis points. Our results are robust to specifications that account for potential endogeneity related to a firm's derivatives use and capital structure decisions. We further find that the reduction in the cost of equity is attributable to both lower market beta and SMB beta, suggesting that firms use derivatives to reduce their financial distress risk and that this distress risk has a systematic component that is priced in the market. Finally, the observed reductions in the cost of equity tend to be largest for smaller firms and for firms utilizing currency and interest rate derivatives.
Introduction
We investigate a potential consequence of financial risk management as it relates to a firm's cost of equity. Specifically, we examine whether derivatives users have a lower cost of equity and, if so, what are the economic factors driving such reductions. For a large sample of non-financial firms taken from two periods (1992-1996 and 2002-2004) , we estimate their cost of equity using procedures suggested by the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) . Using both univariate and pooled regression methods, we find firms that use derivatives have a lower cost of equity than non-users by, on average, 24-78 basis points. Our results hold whether a firm's derivatives activity is measured either as a usage variable or by the extent of its notional holdings. Our findings are also robust to specifications in which we estimate the relation between firms' cost of equity, derivatives use, and leverage using a simultaneous equation framework to account for endogeneity concerns related to a firm's derivatives use and capital structure decisions.
We also conduct an alternative test wherein we identify those firms that were non-users of derivatives and subsequently initiated derivatives programs. Extending the analysis of Guay (1999) who examines the effect on firm's risk exposures following the initiation of derivatives usage, we find a significant decline in the cost of equity of 93 basis points in the first year of adoption for new users during [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] . For the period 2002-2004, we find a negative but insignificant decline of 55 basis points.
We investigate the source for the reduction in the cost of equity as it relates to the various Fama-French risk factors. We find evidence that attributes the reduction in the cost of equity to lower systematic (market) risk and, importantly, a lower SMB (small minus big size) beta. Specifically, while users have on average a 4.9% lower market beta than do non-users, they also have a 40.5% lower SMB beta. When considered in conjunction with their associated risk premiums, both components contribute to the reduction in the cost of equity with the lower SMB beta appearing to have the largest effect. This latter finding is consistent with the notion that firm's derivatives use is associated with the need to mitigate financial distress risk as shown in several studies including, for example, Berkman and Bradbury (1996) , Gay and Nam (1998) , Howton and Perfect (1998) , Graham and Rogers (2002) , and Bartram et al. (2009) . Along these lines, Fama and French (1996) and Vassalou and Xing (2004) find evidence that the SMB factor contains information regarding a firm's default risk and which is priced in the cross-section of returns. Our findings also extend beyond the hedging literature and compliment those of Chava and Purnanandam (2010) who provide evidence that distress risk commands a positive risk premium, thus suggesting that 0378-4266/$ -see front matter Ó 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.10.033 a lowering of distress risk through hedging should result in a lower cost of equity.
Our analysis complements a large body of literature that investigates potential channels through which financial risk management is able to influence future expected cash flows and ultimately firm value.
2 Studies analyzing the magnitude of the potential cash flow effects report evidence that suggests that some of the effects are relatively small. For example, Guay and Kothari (2003) find that the potential median cash flow generated by a firm's derivatives portfolio resulting from a hypothetical three-standarddeviation change in interest rates, currency exchange rate, and commodity prices is approximately $15 million. Graham and Rogers (2002) estimate that a firm's median tax benefit associated with hedging is approximately $9.8 million.
On the other hand, several studies assess the effect of derivatives use on firm value with several studies, but not all, reporting significant increases in value. These studies report firm value effects ranging from as low as zero to as high as 20%. For example, Jin and Jorion (2006) fail to find a significant relation between hedging and firm value for US oil and gas producers. Graham and Rogers (2002) find that increases in firm value resulting from increases in debt capacity due to derivatives use are 1.1% on average. Mackay and Moeller (2007) investigate 34 oil refiners and find that firm value increases by 2-3% when firms hedge concave revenues. Allayannis and Weston (2001) examine the effect of currency derivatives use on a sample of US firms and find currency derivatives users have greater firm value of 4.9%. Similarly, Kim et al. (2006) find a 5.4% increase in firm value for a sample of US firms hedging with currency derivatives. Carter et al. (2006) examine the relation between jet fuel hedging and firm value for firms in the US airline industry and report increases in firm value of 5-10%. Allayannis et al. (2007) examine firms from 35 countries and find that the use of currency derivatives increases firm value by 9-20% for firms with foreign risk exposures. Bartram et al. (2007) analyze a large cross-section of firms from 47 countries in the period [2000] [2001] and report that derivatives users have economically higher value premiums ranging from 1% to 7%, but note that the statistical significance is sometimes weak. 3 Our findings offer a potential reconciliation of the above empirical evidence. We suggest that while risk management can potentially affect levels of future expected cash flows, it may also have an effect on discount rates through a reduction in the covariance of future cash flows with the stochastic discount factor or pricing kernel. If this covariance is indeed reduced, the effective discount rate for the cash flows will also be reduced and a resulting lower cost of equity could potentially lead to an increase in firm value. Still, simply observing a lower cost of equity for derivatives users does not necessarily translate into higher firm value. 4 Rather, for firm value to potentially increase through a reduction in the cost of equity, one can consider the role of the market for real assets (projects) in which firms face different investment opportunity sets. If firms have differential access to projects, a reduction in the cost of equity resulting from hedging may in turn increase the set of positive NPV projects for some firms and not others. Firms increasing in value will be those that can now take on new projects and for which the net present value of such projects exceeds the cost of hedging.
In the following section, we discuss how our analysis ties in with the literature that explores potential avenues through which risk management could affect firms' cost of equity. In Section 3, we describe the data including our sources of derivatives information. Section 4 describes our methods while Section 5 reports the findings of our univariate and multivariate analysis. Section 6 provides the analysis of new users of derivatives while Section 7 concludes.
Risk exposures and the cost of equity: a review
Viewed within a Modigliani and Miller (1958) framework, risk management decisions should not affect firm value. However, the existence of imperfections including factors related to financial distress (Smith and Stulz, 1985) , tax shields (Stulz, 1996; Leland, 1998) , and underinvestment (Froot et al., 1993) have lead some to argue that risk management can increase firm value by increasing future expected cash flows. Of note, Smith and Stulz (1985) and Leland (1998) argue that hedging can increase future expected cash flows by reducing the probability and hence expected costs associated with financial distress. Most studies that empirically examine the relation between hedging and financial distress risk find support for the notion that firms indeed hedge to lower the probability of financial distress. Using firm leverage to proxy for financial distress, these studies typically find a positive relation between hedging and leverage.
5
But whether a firm's financial and market risk exposures are diversifiable or represent risks that are priced remains an important question. If a firm's financial and market exposures have a systematic component, a firm engaged in hedging these exposures could also be rewarded with a lower cost of equity. Indeed, a number of earlier studies suggest such a potential effect. Stulz (1996) argues that while diversified investors may not be concerned about normal cash flow volatility arising from currency and commodity price fluctuations, they will become concerned if it raises the probability of financial distress. Guay (1999) finds declines in interest rate exposure, exchange rate exposure, and stock return volatility following firms' initiation of derivatives positions. Minton and Schrand (1999) find that lower earnings variability is associated with a lower cost of debt and a weighted average cost of capital. However, Hentschel and Kothari (2001) find that the reduction of volatility in equity returns associated with derivatives use is statistically significant, but economically small.
Results of studies more specifically focused on whether financial distress risk is systematic and hence is priced are mixed. In an early study, Chan et al. (1985) observe that the default risk spread between corporate and government bond yields can explain the negative relation between firm size and stock returns. Fama and French (1992) find that average stock returns can be explained by size and book-to-market effects and in Fama and French (1996) they argue that those two effects are proxies for financial distress risk. Vassalou and Xing (2004) also find that size and book-to-market effects are default effects and that default risk is systematic. This is consistent with the notion that more-distressed firms have greater sensitivity to economy-wide recessions and that investors will require higher return for bearing the risk. Cochrane (1999) states that, in addition to the risks of overall market movements, investors earn returns for holding risks related to recessions and financial distress. More recently, Chava and Purnanandam (2010) find a positive cross-sectional relation between expected stock 2 For a comprehensive review of this literature, see Aretz and Bartram (2010) . 3 Using a CAPM framework, they also examine how derivatives use affects firms' market betas and find that beta coefficients for users are 6-22% lower than non-users. 4 To see this consider the situation of a firm lowering its beta and hence cost of equity by investing in a financial asset, say the risk-free asset. Suppose the assets of an all equity firm consist of a $10 million investment in the shares of firm X. The value of the firm is $10 million and its beta is equal to that of X's shares. Now suppose the firm sells the shares and invests the proceeds in Treasury bills, or alternatively, the firm hedges the equity risk of its holdings by entering a forward contract. The beta of the firm is lowered (to zero) and hence its cost of equity is reduced, but clearly the value of the firm remains unchanged at $10 million ignoring the cost of hedging. returns and default risk suggesting that investors require higher returns for bearing default risk. Dichev (1998) , however, finds empirical evidence that firms with greater bankruptcy risk do not earn higher than average returns and concludes that bankruptcy risk is not systematic. In addition, in a more recent study Campbell et al. (2008) find that although financially distressed firms have higher market, HML, and SMB betas, they also have lower returns than do firms with low financial distress.
Our analysis contributes to this literature as we seek to quantify the relation between firms' cost of equity and derivatives use as a risk management strategy. We find derivatives users have a significantly lower cost of equity and attribute the reduction to users having lower market betas and, more importantly, lower SMB betas. This latter finding is consistent with the notion that firm's derivatives use is associated with the mitigation of financial distress risk, which in turn leads to a lower SMB beta.
Data description
Our analysis focuses on derivatives use within non-financial corporations. 6 As in most studies of corporate derivatives use, we implicitly assume that most firms use derivatives for reducing various sources of risk although we recognize managerial incentives to increase risk through derivatives use. 7 We acknowledge other corporate strategies for reducing risk such as through operational hedging as discussed in, for example, Choi and Jiang (2009) . Our data on derivatives use is taken from two periods : 1992-1996 and 2002-2004 . For the 1992-1996 period, we utilize the ''1997 Database of Users of Derivatives'' (the last year of its publication) published by Swaps Monitor Publications, Inc., who at the time was a leading industry vendor of derivatives data. The database contains information regarding the incidence and extent of OTC and exchange-traded derivatives usage by US corporations for fiscal years ending in 1992 through 1996.
8 Swaps Monitor reports derivatives information for all Fortune 500 and Business Week 1000 firms, all other industrial firms with revenues or assets greater than $500 million, and other known derivatives users regardless of firm size. Thus, for this first period, we have 1541 firms with 3440 firm-year observations that show use of derivatives and 2837 firmyear observations that show non-use. Since the Swaps Monitor database ends in 1996, we construct a database of firms' derivatives activities from a more recent period. Specifically, we identify the union of all firms comprising the entire S&P 1500 at any time during the period 2000-2004. Then, from annual 10-K filings, we collect data on these firms' derivatives activities for each of the years 2002-2004. Since our focus is on the practices of non-financial firms, we exclude banks, financial service firms, and insurance companies. We also exclude firms that experience corporate events such as mergers and bankruptcies when they did not file 10-Ks. Our final sample of firms for this period consists of 1341 firms with 2489 firm-year observations that are users of derivatives and 1413 firm-year observations that are non-users.
We obtain financial data from the Standard and Poor's Compustat database. Information on foreign sales, the number of segments, and segment sales come from Compustat's Segment File. The number of analysts following each firm is from the I/B/E/S. We also collect daily stock return information from CRSP. We obtain data to help estimate the three-factor return model from the Ken French website (mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken. french/data_library.html). 
Computing firms' cost of equity
Using the Fama and French three-factor model (1993), we first estimate the following regression using firm's i daily returns in a given year to obtain estimates of its beta coefficients (b i , s i , h i ):
where R i,t , the return for firm i in period t; R f,t , the return on the one-month Treasury bill in period t; R M,t , the return in period t of the value-weight market portfolio consisting of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks; SMB, the difference in returns between small and large-stock portfolios; and HML, the difference in returns between high and low book-to-market portfolios. In addition to the contemporaneous daily return, we also include one lead and lag return to account for infrequent trading (see Dimson, 1979; Fowler and Rorke, 1983) . We obtain each market, SMB, and HML beta by summing the coefficient estimates on the contemporaneous, lead, and lagged values of the corresponding risk premiums.
Next, following methods suggested in French (1997) and D'Mello and Shroff (2000) , we estimate for each firm year an annual risk premium, which we refer to as the cost of equity, as follows:
where CE i,t is the cost of equity of firm i in period t, and B i,t , S i,t , and H i,t are the estimated market, SMB, and HML betas, respectively. The expectations of the R M À R f , SMB, and HML are the arithmetic average daily returns of each factor calculated over the period July 1963 up until each year-end date. We then annualize the cost of equity estimates by multiplying by 252 days. 10 For each firm year, we also compute the industry-adjusted cost of equity by subtracting the median industry cost of equity estimate.
Multivariate framework
We specify the relation between firms' cost of equity (CE) and derivatives use as follows: The use of derivatives is also prevalent in many investment-oriented trading strategies such as described in papers by Frino et al. (2009 ), Szakmary et al. (2010 , Muck (2010) , and Fuertes et al. (2010) . 7 Along this line, Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that managers have incentive to take on greater risk if their compensation has option-like features. Tufano (1996) finds evidence that managers in the gold mining industry who hold mostly options engage in less hedging. Géczy et al. (1997) , however, find that neither shares nor options owned by managers appear to be related to firms' hedging decisions. Bodnar et al. (1998) We also repeat our entire analysis using industry-adjusted leverage computed as the difference between the above leverage estimate and the median industry leverage estimate. The book-to-market ratio, used as a proxy for growth opportunities, is measured as the ratio of book value of equity to the market value of equity. We use the extent of analyst following to proxy for asymmetric information. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that the problem of asymmetric information between managers and shareholders leads firms to obtain external financing at a premium to compensate investors for a potential ''lemons'' problem. Dollar trading volume, used as a proxy for trading liquidity, is measured as the natural logarithm of the average daily dollar trading volume. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets and is expected to be negatively related to the cost of equity. The number of segments, a proxy for industry diversification, is the number of segments in which a firm operates. Diversification reduces a firm's risk and is expected to be negatively related to the cost of equity. To control for potential industry effects, we also include the percentage of a firm's sales in each industry segment s as reported in Compustat.
In addition to using a pooled regression model, we use a simultaneous equation framework. The pooled regression specification can be criticized on the grounds that it assumes that the derivatives use decision to be exogenous whereas in reality it is more likely endogenous. To illustrate, the debt capacity argument, raised in Stulz (1996) and Leland (1998) , suggests that by reducing risk, hedging enables a firm to increase its debt capacity and thus reduce tax liabilities due to leverage increases. Consistent with this argument, Graham and Rogers (2002) find that firms with higher leverage are more likely to hedge and that hedging also leads to higher leverage. Because of these inter-relations between leverage, hedging, and risk, we investigate the cost of equity, derivatives use, and leverage decisions within a system that allows us to avoid false inferences of causality among these decisions resulting from spurious correlations.
Following along the lines of Géczy et al. (1997) Leverage is as defined previously. Froot et al. (1993) argue that hedging can help alleviate a firm's underinvestment problem. The book-to-market ratio is thus included based on the argument that firms with higher growth opportunities, and thus lower book-tomarket ratios, are more likely to hedge. DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) Smith and Stulz, 1985) we include the ratio of tax loss carry forwards to total assets. To proxy for a firm's foreign risk exposure, we include the ratio of foreign sales to net sales. We also include segment sales percentages as well as year dummies to control for industry and time effects. Following Titman and Wessels (1988) and Géczy et al. (1997) , our leverage specification is given as: Consistent with the debt capacity arguments raised by Leland (1998) , we expect the use of derivatives to increase the level of leverage. We expect a positive relation between the book-to-market ratio and leverage as Myers (1977) argues that firms with good investment opportunities are more likely to have less debt. We expect larger firms to have a higher level of leverage. We use both the ratio of depreciation to total assets and the ratio of investment tax credits to total assets to account for tax-related motives for utilizing debt financing. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that non-debt tax shields can act as substitutes for the tax benefits of debt and therefore firms that can shelter larger portions of revenues through tax deductions should have lower demand for debt financing. We compute the variable inventories and plant and equipment, a measure of collateral value, as the sum of inventory plus plant and equipment scaled by total assets. We expect a positive relation between leverage and this collateral value. We calculate return on assets, a proxy for profitability, as the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets, and is expected to be negatively related to leverage. To proxy for the uniqueness of a firm's products, we include SGA expenses, computed as the ratio of selling, general, and administrative expenses to net sales. As discussed in Titman and Wessels (1988) , firms with relatively unique product lines impose potentially higher bankruptcy costs on their customers, suppliers, and employees; thus, a negative relation is expected between the degree of a firm's uniqueness and its leverage. We again include segment sales percentages as well as year dummies to control for industry and time effects. Table 1 provides the results of univariate tests of the differences in mean and median values of the cost of equity between derivatives users and non-users. We also report differences in the three Fama-French betas between the two groups. Findings for the overall sample are presented in panel A, while panels B and C report findings for the individual time periods of 1992-1996 and 2002-2004, respectively . For the overall sample in panel A, users have a significant 60 basis point lower cost of equity than do non-users based on mean values and a significant 34 basis points based on median values. Based on the industry-adjusted estimates, users have a 58 basis point lower cost of equity based on mean differences and a 22 basis point difference based on median values, with estimates significant at the 1% significance level. We also observe that users have both significantly lower market and SMB betas with the largest difference appearing to be for the SMB betas. For the market beta, users have an average of 1.0707 as compared to the non-user average of 1.1260. This represents a significant, lower difference for users of 0.0553. Similarly, for the SMB beta, users have an average value of 0.5185 versus 0.8715 for non-users, a significantly lower difference of 0.3530 or 40.5%. For the HML beta, users have a higher difference of 0.0365 or 15%.
Empirical results

Univariate results
In panel B for years 1992-1996, users have on average a 78 basis point lower cost of equity than non-users based on mean values and a 34 basis point differential based on median values. Based on industry-adjusted values, the differences are 76 and 32 basis points, respectively. Each difference is significant at the 1% level. Further, users have a lower SMB beta and a lower market beta. For years 2002-2004 users have, on average, a 24 basis point lower cost of equity than non-users (32 basis points when based on median values), but the differences are statistically insignificant (p-value of 0.16 for the median test). However, the industry-adjusted differences based on mean and median values are 45 and 38 basis points, respectively, and are both significant. Users again have a significantly lower market and SMB betas and higher HML betas.
To illustrate the relative effect of the differences in the various betas on the overall difference in the cost of equity, we estimate the average annual risk premium over the entire 1963-2004 period for each of the three risk factors (R M,t À R f,t ), SMB, and HML. These estimates are 0.0543, 0.0173, and 0.0510, respectively. Multiplying these risk premiums by the differences in their associated beta, we approximate the contribution of each component to the overall difference in the cost of equity. Using the differences in betas reported in panel A for the entire sample period, the market beta component contributes to a 30 basis point reduction (À0.0553 Â 0.0543) in the observed lower cost of equity for users; the SMB component contributes to a reduction of 61 basis points (À0.3530 Â 0.0173); and the HML component contributes to an increase of 19 basis points (.0365 Â 0.0510).
11 Thus, the lower cost of equity for derivatives users appears to be driven primarily by users having a lower SMB beta and to a lesser extent a lower market beta. Similar findings are also observed in each of the two sub-periods. Table 2 reports the results of the estimated relation between the industry-adjusted cost of equity and derivatives use for each of the three time periods; models 1 and 2 use data covering the entire sample period, models 3 and 4 are for the period 1992-1996, and models 5 and 6 are for the period 2002-2004. 12 Further, for each period, we estimate two models; the first specification utilizes the derivatives use indicator variable while the second uses the total notional amount of derivatives holdings scaled by total assets. Because we use a panel data set, all of our estimations involving the Table 1 Univariate comparison of derivatives users and non-users. This table provides mean and median values of the cost of equity, industry-adjusted cost of equity, and market, SMB, and HML betas for derivatives users and non-users over the periods 1992-1996 and 2002-2004 . A firm's cost of equity is computed as the difference between its expected return and the risk-free rate based on the Fama and French three-factor model. A firm's industry-adjusted cost of equity is its cost of equity estimate less the median industry estimate for a given year. Market beta is the beta related to the market risk premium, SMB beta is the beta related to the SMB risk factor, and HML beta is the beta related to the HML risk factor. 11 We note that the component changes sum to a 72 basis point reduction whereas in panel A of Table 1 we report a reduction of 60 basis points. The difference is due to, for purposes of illustration, the former calculation based on using average annual risk premiums calculated once over the entire 1963-2004 period while the latter is based on using revised average annual risk premiums calculated from 1963 up through the year in which each of the annual betas are computed. Using the latter method, the component changes in the cost of equity related to the market, SMB, and HML factors are À20, À60, and +20 basis points, respectively. 12 We repeat the entire analysis that follows using both the unadjusted and industry-adjusted cost of equity estimates. Because of the similarity in findings, we present results based on the industry-adjusted estimates. Unless noted otherwise, references to the cost of equity are in terms of the industry-adjusted estimates.
Multivariate results
Pooled regression results
pooled regression specification are corrected for firm and time clustering as suggested in Petersen (2009). 13 For model 1 in Table 2 , we see that the derivatives use indicator variable is significant (1% level) and negatively related to the cost of equity. The estimated coefficient of À0.0038 indicates that derivatives users have a lower cost of equity of 38 basis points. Model 2 shows that the cost of equity decreases as the derivatives notional amount increases. Specifically, the cost of equity declines by a significant 2.24 basis points for each 1% increase in notional holdings. Given that the average derivatives notional amount held by users is 10.72%, this translates into a lower cost of equity of 24 basis points (2.24 Ã 10.72).
Similar results are found in the 1992-1996 and 2002-2004 periods. In model 3 in Table 2 , users have a 26 basis point lower cost of equity while model 5 shows a lower average difference of 69 basis points. Models 4 and 6 indicate that the derivatives notional amount variable is inversely related to the cost of equity in each sub-period. The estimated coefficients indicate a decrease in the cost of equity of À1.95% and À2.60%, respectively, per 1% increase in notional holdings. We also repeat the analysis using lagged control variables and find similar results.
Simultaneous equation results
We next estimate the industry-adjusted cost of equity, derivatives use, and industry-adjusted leverage equations within a simultaneous equation framework. We use a two-stage estimation procedure to estimate the parameters. In the first stage, separate OLS regressions are run for the cost of equity and leverage decisions, and a probit (tobit) regression for the derivatives use (notional amount) versus non-use decision. In the second stage, structural equations are estimated by replacing the explanatory variables with the predicted values from the first-stage regressions.
14 Panel A of Table 3 reports the results using data spanning the entire sample period. Consistent with the findings in Table 2 , our main findings still hold after accounting for potential endogeneity; we observe a significant negative relation between the cost of equity and derivatives use when using either the derivatives use indicator variable (model 1) or the derivatives notional amounts variable (model 2). In model 1, the estimated coefficient on the derivatives use indicator variable is À0.0203 and is statistically significant at the 5% level. In model 2, the estimated coefficient on the derivatives notional amount variable is À0.0215 and is significant at the 1% level. In panels B and C of Table 3 , we find consistent results when the analysis is conducted separately on the two subperiods 1992-1996 and 2002-2004, respectively . The coefficients on the derivatives use indicator as shown under Model 1 in each of the sub-periods are À0.0419 and À0.0329, respectively (significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively). For the derivatives notional amount variables shown under Model 2 in each sub-period, the coefficients are À0.1254 and À0.0626, respectively (both significant at the 1% level).
We also note that several findings when using both derivatives use models (probit and tobit) are consistent with prior research. Table 2 Pooled regression of the cost of equity on derivatives use. This table presents results of regression estimations of the relation between firms' industry-adjusted cost of equity and their use of derivatives for a sample of firms over the periods 1992-1996 and 2002-2004 . The dependent variable is the industry-adjusted cost of equity calculated as the cost of equity estimate less the median industry estimate for a given year. A firm's cost of equity is computed as the difference between its expected return and the risk-free rate based on the Fama and French three-factor model. Derivatives use indicator is equal to 1 if a firm reports the use of any type of interest rate, foreign currency, or commodity derivatives and zero otherwise. Derivatives notional amount is the ratio of derivatives notional amount to total assets. Industry-adjusted leverage is computed as the difference between a firm's leverage, measured as (long-term debt + current portion of long-term debt)/total assets, and the median industry leverage for a given year. Book-to-market is the ratio of the book value of equity to market value of equity. Number of analysts is the number of analysts following the firm. Dollar trading volume is the natural logarithm of average daily dollar trading volume in millions. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Number of segments is the number of segments in which a firm operates. The regressions also include the ratio of each segment sales to total sales. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are corrected for firm and year clustering. 13 In a pooled regression, standard errors can be biased downward when the residuals are correlated. In a panel data set the residuals may be correlated across firms and years. We thus adjust the standard errors by correcting for simultaneous clustering by firm and year. Also, our results remain qualitatively unchanged when we use a fixed-effect model that includes year dummies.
14 When estimating the cost of equity equation within our simultaneous equation framework, we also control for year effects by including year dummies.
Table 3
Simultaneous equation analysis of the cost of equity, derivatives use, and leverage. This table presents regression results where the relation between firms' industry-adjusted cost of equity, derivatives use, and industry-adjusted leverage are estimated within a simultaneous equations framework for a sample of firms over the periods 1992-1996 and 2002-2004 . A firm's industry-adjusted cost of equity is calculated as its cost of equity estimate less the median industry estimate for a given year. A firm's cost of equity is computed as the difference between its expected return and the risk-free rate based on the Fama and French three-factor model. Derivatives use indicator is equal to 1 if a firm reports the use of any type of interest rate, foreign currency, or commodity derivatives and zero otherwise. Derivatives notional amount is the ratio of derivatives notional amount to total assets. Industry-adjusted leverage is computed as the difference between a firm's leverage, measured as (long-term debt + current portion of long-term debt)/total assets, and the median industry leverage for a given year. Book-to-market is the ratio of the book value of equity to market value of equity. Number of analysts is the number of analysts following the firm. Dollar trading volume is the natural logarithm of average daily dollar trading volume in millions. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Number of segments is the number of segments in which a firm operates. Quick ratio is calculated as cash and short-term investments over current liabilities. Tax loss carry forwards are tax loss carry forwards scaled by total assets foreign sales to net sales is the percentage of foreign sales to net sales. Depreciation is depreciation expenses over total assets. Investment tax credits are investment tax credits divided by total assets. Inventories, plant and equipment is the ratio of inventory plus plant and equipment to total assets. Return on assets is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets. SGA expenses are selling, general, and administrative expenses divided by net sales. The regressions also include year dummies and the ratio of each segment sales to total sales. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. For example, we find that firm size is positively correlated with the hedging decision while having greater liquidity (quick ratio) is negatively related. Also, we observe that firms with greater exposure to exchange rate risk, as proxied by the ratio of foreign sales to net sales, will likely hedge more (see Allayannis and Ofek, 2001) . Consistent with Gay and Nam (1998), we do not find a significant relation between tax loss carry forwards and hedging. And consistent with Géczy et al. (1997) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001) , we do not find evidence that growth opportunities, as proxied by the book-to-market ratio, is associated with the hedging decision.
Model
With respect to the leverage equations reported in Models 1 and 2 of each panel, derivatives use is strongly associated with higher leverage (1% significance level), which is consistent with the debt capacity argument. The estimated coefficients on depreciation, return on assets, and SGA expense are significantly negative. We find a sometimes positive and significant relation between leverage and inventories, plant and equipment, consistent with the argument that firms with greater asset collateral borrow more.
Firm size effects
Next, we examine further the effect of firm size on the relation between derivatives use and the cost of equity. For each year, we assign firms to size terciles (with tercile 1 comprising the smallest firms and tercile 3 the largest firms) and repeat the previous univariate and multivariate analyses. Table 4 reports the findings of the univariate analysis. As a general observation, the cost of equity estimates appears to become increasingly lower in firm size. To illustrate, the mean values are 0.0844, 0.0767, and 0.0703, respectively, while the industry-adjusted cost of equity estimates are 0.0100, 0.0033, and À0.0016, respectively. These observations are consistent with results presented in Tables 2 and 3 that show a negative relation between the estimated cost of equity and firm size. Similarly, inspecting the various risk factors in Table 4 across terciles, the mean and median market betas appear to be slightly decreasing in firm size. To illustrate, mean values are 1.1096, 1.0947, and 1.0765, respectively, while the median values are 1.0118, 1.0034, and 0.9867, respectively. 15 In contrast the SML betas are of distinct different magnitudes with a mean (median) value of 1.0904 (0.9419) for the smaller firms in tercile 1 and only 0.1828 (0.0685) for the larger, tercile 3 firms. In our tests of differences between users and non-users, we see in panel A for the sample of smaller firms that the estimated (unadjusted) cost of equity of users is significantly lower than that of non-users by 84 and 77 basis points, respectively, based on differences in mean and median values. For industry-adjusted values, the differences are 90 and 55 basis points, respectively. Of note, users also have significantly lower market betas as compared to non-users (1.0415 versus 1.1453) as well as lower SMB betas (1.0232 versus 1.1256).
For mid-size firms (tercile 2) reported in panel B, both the mean and median cost of equity differences are insignificant. While both the market and SMB betas of users are significantly lower than those of non-users, their HML betas are significantly higher. Somewhat surprising, for the largest firms (tercile 3) reported in panel C, the differences in the cost of equity are significantly positive, suggesting that the larger firms who use derivatives actually have a higher cost of equity than non-users; we investigate this further in our multivariate analysis. Also, while there appear to be no Table 4 Univariate comparison of derivatives users and non-users for size terciles. This table provides mean and median values of the cost of equity, industry-adjusted cost of equity, and market, SMB, and HML betas for derivatives users and non-users breaking down into size terciles over the periods 1992-1996 and 2002-2004 . A firm's cost of equity is computed as the difference between its expected return and the risk-free rate based on the Fama and French three-factor model. A firm's industry-adjusted cost of equity is its cost of equity estimate less the median industry estimate for a given year. Market beta is the beta related to the market risk premium, SMB beta is the beta related to the SMB risk factor, and HML Beta is the beta related to the HML risk factor. 15 Both the mean and median market betas of firms in terciles 1 are statistically greater than those of tercile 3 firms. apparent differences between the market and SMB betas of users and non-users, the HML betas of users are significantly larger.
We again model the relation between the estimated cost of equity and derivatives use using the earlier presented pooled regression model. The results are presented in Table 5 . 16 For the sample of smaller firms (tercile 1), the estimated coefficients on both the derivatives use indicator and notional amount variable (À0.0137 and À0.0426, respectively) are negative and significant at the 1% level. In results not reported, we observe similar significant findings in each sub-period. For mid-size firms (tercile 2), only the coefficient on the notional amounts variable (À0.0190) is significantly negative (10% significance level). Also in results not reported, in neither sub-period is the estimated coefficient on the derivatives use indicator variable significant. For the larger firms (tercile 3), again only the coefficient on the notional amounts variable (À0.0232) is significantly negative (10% significance level). Though not conclusive, the above findings suggest that the negative relation between derivatives use and cost of equity is strongest for the firms in the smallest size tercile.
Type of derivatives
We next investigate whether the type of derivative matters when considering the relation between derivatives use and the cost of equity. We repeat our pooled regression analysis by instead including separate measures for interest rate, currency, and commodity derivatives use. We estimate three models; the first two models each utilize three derivative indicator variables while the third model uses notional amounts. The first of the derivative indicator variables is defined as having the value 1 if a firm uses interest rate derivatives, and the value 0 otherwise. Similarly, the second and third indicator variables reflect any use of currency and commodity derivatives, respectively. The third model includes measures of the use of interest rate, currency, and commodity derivatives defined in terms of their respective notional amounts.
The results using data for the entire sample period are presented in Table 6 . In the first model, which is the more restrictive of the two models using derivative indicator variables, we find that the estimated coefficients on both the interest rate and currency variables are significantly negative at À0.0028 and À0.0047, respectively, indicating that both variables contribute to the overall reduction in the cost of equity. Though the estimated currency coefficient appears to be larger in magnitude than the interest rate coefficient, we test the hypothesis that the coefficients are equal and cannot reject (p-value equal to 0.4335). Interestingly, the estimated coefficient on the commodity indicator variable is significantly positive indicating a positive association with the estimated cost of equity. In the less restrictive model 2, we also include several interaction variables reflecting various combinations of firms' derivatives use. Similar findings are observed as we again see evidence that both interest rate and currency derivatives use are associated with lower estimates of the cost of equity while commodity use, when interacted with interest rate or currency derivatives use, appears to be positively related.
The results based on using notional amounts are presented under model 3 in Table 6 . The estimated coefficients on the interest rate and currency variables are again negative and statistically significant in models 1 and 2, respectively. In model 3 the estimated coefficient on the currency variable is À0.0403 (1% significance level), while that for the interest rate variable is Table 5 Pooled regression of the cost of equity on derivatives use for size terciles. This table presents results of regression estimations of the relation between firms' industry-adjusted cost of equity and their use of derivatives breaking down into size terciles for a sample of firms over the periods 1992-1996 and 2002-2004 . The dependent variable is the industryadjusted cost of equity calculated as the cost of equity estimate less the median industry estimate for a given year. A firm's cost of equity is computed as the difference between its expected return and the risk-free rate based on the Fama and French three-factor model. Derivatives use indicator is equal to 1 if a firm reports the use of any type of interest rate, foreign currency, or commodity derivatives and zero otherwise. Derivatives notional amount is the ratio of derivatives notional amount to total assets. Industry-adjusted leverage is computed as the difference between a firm's leverage, measured as (long-term debt + current portion of long-term debt)/total assets, and the median industry leverage for a given year. Book-to-market is the ratio of the book value of equity to market value of equity. Number of analysts is the number of analysts following the firm. Dollar trading volume is the natural logarithm of average daily dollar trading volume in millions. Number of segments is the number of segments in which a firm operates. The regressions also include the ratio of each segment sales to total sales. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are corrected for firm and year clustering. 16 In results not reported, we also examine the relation within our simultaneous equation framework and find similar results. negative (À0.0206), but only marginally significant (p-value of 0.1329). Taken together, the results suggest that currency and, to a less extent, interest rate derivatives use are the primarily drivers of the observed lower estimates in the cost of equity for derivatives users. 
Analysis of new derivatives users
We next examine a sample of firms that initiated derivatives programs during our sample period. By investigating changes in the cost of equity before and after such initiation, we help mitigate concerns that non-users may not be an appropriate benchmark group for comparing users because of differing firm characteristics.
Following Guay (1999) , for years 1992-1996 we classify a firm as a new derivatives user if it reports derivatives use in year t, but does not report a position in derivatives in any of the years prior to year t during the sample period (firms that report derivatives use in the year 1992 are thus not identified as new users). This produces a sample of 641 firms that we identify as new users, and for which derivatives notional amount information is available for 421 of the firms. For the period 2002-2004, since we have only three years of derivatives use data, we look at years 2003 and 2004 and classify a firm as a new user if it reports the use of derivatives in year t, but did not use derivatives for the two consecutive prior years. We also verify that these firms did not use derivatives during 2001 or at any time during the period 1992-1996. This produces 78 firms that we identify as new users and for which we obtained derivatives notional amounts for 60 firms. In total, 719 firms are identified as new users of which notional amounts are obtained for 481 firms.
We report the results of the univariate tests in Table 7 . For the entire sample of 719 firms reported in panel A, new users experience a mean reduction in the cost of equity of 89 basis points, which is significant at the 5% level. The median reduction is 15 basis points, but is not significant. Based on industry-adjusted values, the mean and median reductions are 119 and 34 basis points, respectively, with both estimates strongly significant. New users also experience generally significant reductions in their market, SMB, and HML betas.
These findings appear to be driven by new users in the period 1992-1996. As shown in panel B, the mean and median reductions Table 6 Pooled regression of the cost of equity on the type of derivatives use. This table presents results of regression estimations of the relation between firms' industryadjusted cost of equity and the type of derivatives for a sample of firms over the periods 1992-1996 and 2002-2004 . A firm's industry-adjusted cost of equity is calculated as its cost of equity estimate less the median industry estimate for a given year. A firm's cost of equity is computed as the difference between its expected return and the risk-free rate based on the Fama and French three-factor model. Interest, currency, and commodity refer to the use of interest rate, currency and commodity derivatives, respectively. In models 1 and 2, we measure derivatives use with indicator variables defined to equal the value 1 if a particular derivative type is used, and 0 otherwise. In model 3, we use derivatives notional amounts scaled by total assets. Industry-adjusted leverage is computed as the difference between a firm's leverage, measured as (long-term debt + current portion of long-term debt)/total assets, and the median industry leverage for a given year. Book-to-market is the ratio of the book value of equity to market value of equity. Number of Analysts is the number of analysts following the firm. Dollar trading volume is the natural logarithm of average daily dollar trading volume in millions. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Number of segments is the number of segments in which a firm operates. The regressions also include the ratio of each segment sales to total sales. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are corrected for firm and year clustering. * Statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
Table 7
Changes in risk characteristics of new users of derivatives. This table presents changes in the cost of equity, industry-adjusted cost of equity, and three-factor betas for a sample of firms which became new users of derivatives during the periods 1992 and 2002 -2004 . For years 1992 , a firm is categorized as a new user if it reports the use of derivatives in year t, but does not use derivatives prior to year t. For years 2002-2004, a firm is categorized as a new user if it reports the use of derivatives in year t, but does not use derivatives for two consecutive years prior to year t. A firm's cost of equity is computed as the difference between its expected return and the risk-free rate based on the Fama and French three-factor model. A firm's industryadjusted cost of equity is its cost of equity estimate less the median industry estimate for a given year. Market beta is the beta related to the market risk premium, SMB beta is the beta related to the SMB risk factor, and HML beta is the beta related to the HML risk factor. in cost of equity for the 641 new user firms are 93 and 15 basis points, respectively. Based on industry-adjusted values, new users experience a significant reduction of 129 and 36 basis points, respectively. New users also experience a significant decrease in the SMB beta, as well as marginally significant declines in the market and HML betas (p-values of 13% and 11% for the mean difference test, respectively). For years 2002-2004 (panel C) , the 78 new users experience a mean and median decline in the cost of equity of 55 and 25 basis points, respectively, but the reductions are not statistically significant. Similarly, for industry-adjusted values, the mean and median declines are 38 and 32 basis points, but again are insignificant.
Following the pooled regression estimation procedure employed earlier, we further examine the effect of the initiation of a derivatives program by regressing changes in each firm's industry-adjusted cost of equity on changes in its notional derivatives holdings and other control variables. Changes in each variable are measured from year t À 1 to year t. The regression results are reported in Table 8 . 18 The two variables of main interest are the intercept and derivatives notional amount variables. The intercept captures the change resulting from the initiation of derivatives use and the coefficient on the derivatives notional amount variable reflects the incremental change per unit of derivatives use. For the overall sample, the estimated intercept is À0.0180 or 180 basis points, but is insignificantly different from zero. However, we find that the estimated coefficient of the derivatives notional amount variable is À0.0095, which is significant at the 1% level. We interpret this as indicating that a 1% increase in derivatives use is associated with a decrease in the cost of equity of 0.95 basis points. A similar significant finding is observed for the 1992-1996 period (estimated coefficient of À0.0090). However, the estimated coefficient Table A .3, the mean notional amount of users following the initiation of derivatives use is a relatively low 5.51% of total assets and is lower by approximately one-half as compared to the amount observed for new users during the period 1992-1996 (12.70%) . Second, to the extent that the number of segments proxies for firm hedging through industry or operational diversification, new users during 2002-2004 had a significantly greater number of segments than during 1992-1996 (2.68 segments versus 1.54) and thus a lower potential for achieving further hedging benefits through derivatives use.
Conclusions
To our knowledge this study is the first to focus specifically on the relation between derivatives use and the cost of equity. We utilize two large data bases containing information regarding the derivatives activities of US non-financial firms over the 1992-1996 and 2002-2004 time periods. We compute estimates of firms' cost of equity using the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and subsequently analyze its relation to the firms' use of derivatives. We report evidence that firms using derivatives have, on average, a lower cost of equity than non-users with estimates ranging from 24 to 78 basis points. These findings are robust to specifications where we measure firms' derivatives use as a dummy variable as well as by the amount of notional holdings.
We then attempt to identify potential factors driving these findings as relates to the various Fama-French risk factors. We find evidence that the lower cost of equity estimates of derivatives users are attributable in part to derivatives users having lower systematic (market) risk and lower SMB (small minus big size) beta. Our results support the notion that firms use derivatives to reduce their financial distress risk and that this distress risk has a systematic component that is priced in the market. These results compliment those of Chava and Purnanandam (2010) who find a positive relation between distress risks and expected stock returns. Our results are also consistent with evidence presented in Fama and French (1996) and Vassalou and Xing (2004) who find that the SMB factor contains information regarding a firm's default risk, which is priced in the cross-section of returns, and are contrary to the empirical findings of Campbell et al. (2008) .
Additionally, we find that the observed reductions in the cost of equity are more pronounced for smaller firms and for firms making use of currency and interest rate derivatives. Our final tests examine the changes in risk and related characteristics of a sub-sample of firms that initiated derivatives programs during our sample period. Consistent with our cross-sectional results, we find that Table 8 Regression results for the cost of equity changes of new users of derivatives. This table presents results of regression estimations of the relation between firms' changes in the industry-adjusted cost of equity and their derivatives use for a sample of firms which became new users of derivatives during the periods 1992 and 2002 -2004 . For years 1992 , a firm is categorized as a new user if it reports the use of derivatives in year t, but does not use derivatives prior to year t. For years 2002-2004, a firm is categorized as a new user if it reports the use of derivatives in year t, but does not use derivatives for two consecutive years prior to year t. The dependent variable is the change in the industry-adjusted cost of equity from year t À 1 to year t. A firm's industry-adjusted cost of equity is its cost of equity estimate less the median industry estimate for a given year. A firm's cost of equity is computed as the difference between its expected return and the risk-free rate based on the Fama and French three-factor model. Change in derivatives notional amount is the change in the ratio of derivatives notional amount to total assets from year t À 1 to year t. Change in industry-adjusted leverage is the change in industry-adjusted leverage from year t À 1 to year t. Industry-adjusted leverage is computed as the difference between a firm's leverage, measured as (long-term debt + current portion of long-term debt)/ total assets, and the median industry leverage for a given year. Change in book-tomarket is the change in the ratio of the book value of equity to market value of equity from year t À 1 to year t. Change in number of analysts is the change in the number of analysts following the firm from year t À 1 to year t. Change in dollar trading volume is the change in the natural logarithm of average daily dollar trading volume in millions from year t À 1 to year t. Change in size is the change in the natural logarithm of total assets from year t À 1 to year t. Change in number of segments is the change in the number of segments in which a firm operates from year t À 1 to year t. The regressions also include change in the ratio of each segment sales to total sales. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are corrected for firm and year clustering. new users experience reductions in their cost of equity, notably during the 1992-1996 sub-period, which we again are able to attribute to a reduction in their market and SMB betas. 1992-1996 and 2002-2004 . Derivatives notional amount is the ratio of derivatives notional amount to total assets. Industry-adjusted leverage is computed as the difference between a firm's leverage, measured as (long-term debt + current portion of long-term debt)/total assets, and the median industry leverage for a given year. Book-to-market is the ratio of the book value of equity to market value of equity. Number of analysts is the number of analysts following the firm. Dollar trading volume is the natural logarithm of average daily dollar trading volume in millions. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Number of segments is the number of segments in which a firm operates. Quick ratio is calculated as cash and short-term investments over current liabilities. Tax loss carry forwards are tax loss carry forwards scaled by total assets. Foreign sales to net sales is the percentage of foreign sales to net sales. Depreciation is depreciation expenses over total assets. Investment tax credits are investment tax credits divided by total assets. Inventories, plant and equipment is the ratio of inventory plus plant and equipment to total assets. Return on assets is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets. SGA expenses are selling, general, and administrative expenses divided by net sales. Derivatives notional amount is the ratio of derivatives notional amount to total assets. A firm's industry-adjusted cost of equity is calculated as its cost of equity estimate less the median industry estimate for a given year. A firm's cost of equity is computed as the difference between its expected return and the risk-free rate based on the Fama and French three-factor model. Market beta is the beta related to the market risk premium, SMB Beta is the beta related to the SMB risk factor, and HML beta is the beta related to the HML risk factor. Industry-adjusted leverage is computed as the difference between a firm's leverage, measured as (long-term debt + current portion of long-term debt)/total assets, and the median industry leverage for a given year. Book-to-market is the ratio of the book value of equity to market value of equity. Number of analysts is the number of analysts following the firm. Dollar trading volume is the natural logarithm of average daily dollar trading volume in millions. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Number of segments is the number of segments in which a firm operates. Quick ratio is calculated as cash and short-term investments over current liabilities. Tax loss carry forwards are tax loss carry forwards scaled by total assets. Foreign sales to net sales is the percentage of foreign sales to net sales. Depreciation is depreciation expenses over total assets. Investment tax credits are investment tax credits divided by total assets. Inventories, plant and equipment is the ratio of inventory plus plant and equipment to total assets. Return on assets is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets. SGA expenses are selling, general, and administrative expenses divided by net sales. Italic denotes significance at the 1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) reports the use of derivatives in year t, but does not use derivatives for two consecutive years prior to year t. Derivatives notional amount is the ratio of derivatives notional amount to total assets. Industry-adjusted leverage is computed as the difference between a firm's leverage, measured as (long-term debt + current portion of long-term debt)/total assets, and the median industry leverage for a given year. Book-tomarket is the ratio of the book value of equity to market value of equity. Number of analysts is the number of analysts following the firm. Dollar trading volume is the natural logarithm of average daily dollar trading volume in millions. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Number of segments is the number of segments in which a firm operates. 
